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Over the last decade there has been a sea change in
public attitudes to international investment around the world  .
The first section examines this shift in historical context. The
opening up of the capital account of the balance of payments in
many developing countries, the final ending of exchange controls
in OECD countries (in 1979 in the UK), the progressive
deregulation of domestic capital markets in most developed and
increasingly in many developing countries, and the linking of
global financial markets through the computer, have led to an
explosion in international capital flows in the  1990's, whose
dimensions and composition are charted in the second section. This
growing integration could be taken as an indication that few
barriers remain to the flow of international capital. The third
section examines whether this is the case by surveying studies
which have attempted to compare the current extent of integration
with that at the end of the first liberal international economic
order  (LIEO) in the 19th century. This provides some indirect
evidence of current barriers to international flows of capital.
The fourth section looks at the effects of taxation on these
flows, and the final section at the growing clamor for their
regulation -or postponement of deregulation- particularly in the
light of the recent Asian financial crisis. Given my expertise and
to delimit the otherwise unlimited scope of the paper I will
largely be dealing with developing countries.4
I. CHANGING ATTITUDES TO FOREIGN CAPITAL1
The first LIE0 created under British leadership after the
repeal of the Corn laws in 1846, was marked by free movement of
goods, labor and capital. This led to great booms in foreign
lending to the areas of new settlement in America and the
Antipodes as well as many parts of the Third World. These booms
were promoted by the extension of norms of conduct based on
classical liberalism -in particular the sanctity of private
property- through the expansion of Pax Britannica, and its
influence on the local legal institutions of many independent
states, as in Latin America. A strict set of legal rules was
established through a number of commercial
European states (see Lipson (1985)).
treaties between
But this liberal stance did not survive the advent of the
First World War, which marked the beginnings of The Road to
Serfdom leading to  collectivist  experiments around the world.
These did not come to an end till the collapse of its most
egregious example in 1989. With the Soviet and Mexican
revolutions, the legitimacy of the 19th century rules had begun to
be  questioned- not least in the Third World with the explicit
introduction of etatist policies by Ataturk in Turkey as a means
of economic development. Subsequently, there was a worldwide
erosion of public acceptance of the sanctity of private property
rights when faced with social policies designed to promote the
general -usually nationalist-weal.
With the establishment of Pax Americana after 1945, there was
a partial restoration of these 19th century international property
rights. But this did not extend to the Third World, which
experienced an explosion of economic nationalism, as following
decolonization, these new nation-states were determined to assert
their rights of national sovereignty against any purported
international property rights. Direct foreign investors, having
'This section is based on La1 (1990)5
provided more local hostages to fortune, bore the brunt of the
deleterious effects of this disintegration of the legal order.
Most developing country governments (and many European ones too)
being both nationalist and dirigiste, sought to regulate, tax or
nationalize particular foreign investments on grounds of national
social utility rather than any particular antagonism to private
property. This made it difficult for the US to identify
expropriation of foreign capital with a socialist ideology, as the
nationalization of foreign oil companies in the 1960's and early
70's by right-wing governments in the Middle East proved. With
exchange controls ubiquitous in the Third World, short term
capital flows were also effectively snuffed out. Official capital
flows filled the breach (see La1 (1996)).
Ironically, the tide began to turn with the OPEC coup of
1973. Besides generating the Third World demand for a planned
distibutivist global economy (christened the New International
Economic Order (NIEO)), it also created the massive OPEC surpluses
whose recycling by offshore subsidiaries of Western commercial
banks to many Third World  countries- particularly in Latin
America- led to the 1980's debt crisis. This in turn precipitated
the process of worldwide
and then, since 1989,
collectivism to an end.
As the owners of
economic liberalization. First, haltingly
as a flood. This brought the age of
the OPEC surpluses were Third World
creditors, the distinction between developed country capital
exporters and developing country capital importers became blurred.
A process furthered in the 1980's and 1990's by the evolution of
many of the successful East Asian  NIC's into important foreign
direct investors around the world. A growing convergence in the
interests of both developed and developing countries in protecting
international property rights is now evident, and international
institutions like the OECD and WTO are undertaking to develop a
multilateral legal regime for capital flows to parallel that for
trade in goods and services. If such a regime is needed and what
rules should be adopted are questions we take up later.6
The communications revolution and the ending of exchange
controls led to the linking of developed country financial
markets. The sheer weight of the resulting transactions across the
foreign exchanges led to a steady erosion of the powers of
national governments to act as the currency monopolists of yore.
In effect, the denationalization of money sought by Hayek was in
place. Even in developing countries, with their exchange controls,
the massive capital flight that accompanied the debt crisis,
particularly in Latin America, demonstrated the impotence of
national authorities pursuing 'unsound' polices. It impelled them
to undertake the liberalization of their economies, which is now
the hallmark of a worldwide Age of Reform.
But a backlash against the political effects of this
globalization- particularly as it effects the role of national
governments in the economy- is already in place and poses an
incipient threat to the recently resurrected LIEO. There are
ongoing attempts to regulate the offshore banking centers, and
various variants on the Tobin tax being proposed to throw sands in
the working of international financial mechanisms to allow the old
Keynesian  policies- which depended on controls of short term
capital- some room to work. These regulatory proposals also hope
to reduce the purported volatility of short term flows- which on
one view is due to the their speculative nature- and which is
supposed to have brought the Asian tigers to their knees. These
are also issues I take up later.
As sound fiscal policies are very much a part and parcel
of the new Age of Reform, governments of every political stripe
have faut de mieux been impelled to embrace the privatisations
pioneered by Lady Thatcher, and to increasingly seek private
financing of what were in the past considered to be the sacred
cows of the public sector - the natural monopolies providing
various infrastructure services. Given other competing demands for
domestic savings, increasingly, foreign investment on the 19th
century pattern is being sought to finance and build this
infrastructure. But old habits die hard, and various forms of7
dirigiste regimes are in place or being proposed to regulate such
investments in 'public goods'. We also examine the validity of
these arguments for regulation in a later section.
II. DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS
Table 1 and  Fig.1, provide a summary of the size and
composition of recent capital flows to developing and non-OECD
countries respectively. Some notion of how these figures relate to
global capital flows is provided by the following statistics: in
1995 borrowing on international capital markets was $1.3 trillion,
of which the non-OECD share was 20.4%, while their share in
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows was 35.2%. (OECD (1997)).
From this data it is apparent that, official flows which
were the dominant form of foreign capital flows to developing
countries in the  1960's_80's are now a diminishing share, and of
the private non-politicized flows the largest share (53%) is
accounted by FDI, followed by private debt (33%) and portfolio
equity flows (14%). Razin  et.al (1998) note that this pattern of
private flows mimics the pecking order in corporate finance of the
capital structure of firms- with internal financing (corresponding
to FDI) being preferred above external finance, and debt being
preferred to equity (in case where the latter is needed).
What is the contribution of FDI (the most important flow to
developing countries) to world GDP and that in developing
countries? Table 2 (from World Bank(1997)) provides the answer,
while Fig.2, shows the relative share of FDI flows in world,
developing country and OECD GDP. Both show the growing importance
of FDI in world production.
In many industries there is a new international division of
labor emerging in the communications age, mediated by
multinational companies. This is described as "just in time
production" by the World Bank (1977). In this contemporary version
of an international 'putting out system' the centers in developed8
countries provide the design and marketing capacity for the
production of bespoke products tailored to changing and highly
differentiated tastes, which are produced 'just in time' by
flexible production facilities in the cheapest production
locations around the world- most often in developing countries.
Fig. 3 provides some quantitative dimensions of the growing scale
of this system of 'virtual factories'.
III. ARE WORLD CAPITAL MARKETS INTEGRATED?
But how well integrated are world capital markets, or are
they still segmented by regulatory and tax barriers? Answering
this question has spawned a vast literature masterfully surveyed
by Obstfeld (1995) (Also see Lessard (1991)).  Most of these
studies examine the extent to which world capital markets
correspond to the 'nirvana' model of perfect capital mobility in
an Arrow-Debreu world. In this Utopia, (i) the law of one price
would hold with an asset's price being the same wherever it is
sold; (ii) there would be mutual insurance against purely
idiosyncratic fluctuations in national consumption leading to
consumption co-movements among countries being positively
correlated; (iii) there would be an efficient international
allocation of investment with rates of return to investment being
equalized among countries.
As the real world relevance of this nirvana economics is
questionable (see  Lal(1998)) it is hardly surprising that these
predictions are not borne out.
Nor can much be made of the stylized facts used to suggest
that international capital markets are inefficient (see Lessard
(1991)). These include:(l) domestic savings and investment rates
are highly correlated suggesting that international capital flows
have little effect in linking global savings and investment (the
Feldstein-Horioka (1980) effect). (2) Asset portfolios show a
marked 'home market' bias relative to the ideal (Tesar and Werner
(1995)). (3) The internationalization of the market for corporate9
control is limited and asymmetric.
A better way to judge how far current global capital
market integration has proceeded is by comparison with the
situation at the height of the 19th century LIEO- when we know
that tax and regulatory barriers were minimal. There are two ways
to make this comparison: through a price or a quantity route. As
we do not have historical data on identical assets in different
markets comparable to the onshore-offshore Euro-currency price
differentials which have been used to judge integration today,
faut de mieux we have to rely on the quantity route.
The latter route (via quantity) is based on the
argument that in a completely integrated global capital market, as
the productivity of a country's investment is not necessarily
linked to the determinants of its savings rate, a rise in the
latter should lead to their most efficient deployment world wide,
which ceteris paribus should lead to a current account surplus and
a capital outflow, and conversely if there is
productivity of a country's investment, to a
deficit and a capital inflow. This has been used
Horioka (1980) to argue that, in such a world,
investment rates in a particular country
systematically associated. They suggest a
regression of the form:
(I/Y)j = a + b (S/Y)' + uj






where I/Y is the investment ratio; S/Y the savings ratio,
U a random disturbance for each country j. If capital
completely immobile b = 1, so that the lower the value of
from unity the greater the degree of capital mobility.





interpretation of these type of regressions.2. But, despite this,
as the data on savings and investment rates is readily available,
faut mieux, at least an imperfect measure of capital market
integration can be derived. There are moreover, two sets of data
2See Obstfeld (1995) for details.10
(with somewhat different countries covered) which allow us to
obtain estimates of b from the late 19th century to the present.
These are those compiled by Taylor (1996) and Maddison (1991,
1992). Taylor has estimated the b coefficients for his
historical data and we have done so for the Maddison data. The
resulting values are charted in Figure 4  . It also incorporates
the estimated coefficients for a pooled sample of Taylor and
Maddison countries.
A similar story emerges from all three trends in the  b-
estimates, which is in consonance with the qualitative historical
evidence we have on changing capital mobility over this long
period.3 What this shows is that, till 1900 there was growing
capital market integration, which was partially reversed in the
early part of this century. There was a partial recovery in
integration in the  192Os, but with the Great Depression and the
Second World War there was further disintegration which continued
into the post-war period till the 1960s. This was followed by
some increased integration, but which did not become marked till
the 1980s. So that now the index is roughly where it was in 1870.
Harberger (1980) has rightly argued that for judging
capital market integration the evidence on rates of returns to
private capital is more relevant than these savings-investment
regressions. Basing himself on the estimates he made of aggregate
real rates of return to capital in 18 countries in Harberger
(1978) and summaries of studies of private rates of return to
private capital in 6 countries, as well as estimates of gross
capital flows in and out of 100 countries as a fraction of each
one's gross investment, he concludes that, the evidence is in
consonance with the expectation of a reasonably well-functioning
world capital market. But this is not the textbook model of a
perfect capital market where changes in investment are completely
mediated by corresponding movements in the country's capital
3See Taylor (1996, p. 13) for details and references. For the
current period see Obstfeld (1995) and Goldstein (1993).11
account. The reason for this is the asymmetric perceptions of
default risk by borrowers and lenders in the world capital market,
so that foreign lenders apply a risk premia to foreign lending.
This would be sufficient to generate the real world capital market
where domestic investment (savings) is partially financed
(finances) by domestic savings (foreign investment).
In addition there are a number of policy induced set
of potential barriers to the efficient functioning of
international capital markets identified by Lessard (1991). These
are : (1) capital controls (2) tax regime interactions which
effectively impose a tax on cross- border flows (3) discrimination
between domestic and foreign claimants in contract enforcement.
These are the barriers we examine in the next two sections.
IV. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL FLOWS.
To see the variety of disincentives and incentives to the
major form of international flows  - FDI- Table 3 provides
UNCTAD's summary of the major policies effecting the entry and
operations of foreign investors. It is impossible in this paper to
examine all these in any detail, but there is a simple framework
which allows us to integrate various aspects of the policy regime
to judge the determinants of the social profitability of FDI from
the viewpoint of the host country.
The first point to note is that, all the public interventions
effecting a particular FDI can in principle be identified as
equivalent to particular taxes and subsidies, which effect the
income stream of the foreign investor, and the host country's
national income. Using the social cost benefit framework for
project evaluation developed by Little-Mirrlees (1974)4 we can
succinctly express the net social benefit  (NSB) and net private
benefit (NPB) from the operation of FDI in any year(t) as:
(I) NSB=Pxf.X  -  <<  ai.Pif  - Cc hj.Wsj + E + K  - d  - V
4 Also see La1 (19741, (1980)12
i j
(II) NPB= d+  V= Pxd X  -<< ai. Pid  - << hj .  Wj  - r  - T
i j
where the time subscripts (t) have been suppressed and  :
Pf is the border ('world') price of the output (x) and inputs (i)
Pd is the domestic price of output (x) and inputs (i)
X is the output
ai the input of i'th good including
hj the input of j'th type of labor
WSI the 'shadow' wage for j 'th type
Wj the market wage for j'th type of
E the net external effects of the
K the capital inflow inclusive of





d the dividends and capital repatriated
V the retained earnings of the foreign investor
r the return to domestic capitalists if FDI is a joint venture
T sum of all direct taxes levied on the foreigner.
Substituting for (d+v) in I from II, yields:
(III)  NSB= (Pxf- Pxd)X +<<ai(Pid - Pif) +"hj(Wj-Wsj)+ E+K+r+T
The contribution of the last four terms to NSB from FDI measure
its direct benefits, viz, through the direct taxes paid, the
return to associated domestic capital in the case of a joint
venture5, the net capital inflow and any net external effects
associated with the project. The third term represents the net
implicit tax on the foreigner for using domestic labor at a wage
above its social opportunity cost, whilst the first two terms take
5 This term will only contribute to the NSB from FDI compared
with an identical project financed from domestic sources if the
return to domestic capitalists is higher than the social discount
rate in the country. For to get the NPV of the FDI, the stream of
dated NSB's given by III, has to be discounted by this rate.13
account of the effects of the protective regime, with tariffs on
the FDI's output providing a subsidy and on its inputs a tax. The
combined effects of these two trade related measures can be shown
by making use of the definition of the effective rate of
protection  (EPRY
I which yields the respective net benefits as:
(IV) NSB = - EPR.V* + "hj (Wj-W,j) +E+K+r+T
J
(V) NPB  =(l+EPR) .V*  - j "hj.Wj -r- T
where V* is value added at world prices.
It is immediately apparent that a free trade regime maximizes the
social benefits from FDI to the host country, whereas inducing
import substituting, tariff-jumping FDI could harm the country as
has in fact been found by numerous empirical studies. (see
Lal(1975); La11 and  Streeten (1977), Balasubramanyam and  Sapsford
(1996)). These expressions also show that all the so-called
concessions or discriminatory measures for inducing or retarding
different types of FDI shown in Table 3 also have no rationale.
The optimal amount of FDI is induced by maintaining free trade, a
level playing field in terms of infrastructure etc between
domestic and foreign firms, and in charging both, the true social
costs of its provision. Moreover, as a number of studies have
shown7 tax and special fiscal incentives have little effect on
FDI. So fiscal competition to attract FDI is not sensible. But as
a study of US FDI in Mexico (Shah and Slemrod (1991)) shows it is
sensitive to the tax regimes in Mexico and the US and the relative
regulatory environments. So what principle should countries adopt
in taxing FDI, assuming as much of this literature unrealistically
does that countries are ruled by Platonic Guardians?
An extension of the argument justifying the Little-
6 The EPR defined by the ratio of value added at domestic(V)
to border (world) prices  (V*) :
(l+EPR)=V/V*=(Pxd.X  -<<&.Pid)/  (Pxf.X -<<ai.Pif)
7see World Bank (1997) n.19, p.53 for references.14
Mirrlees(LM) shadow pricing rules used above (see Diamond-Mirrlees
(1971)), provides the justification for basing such taxation on
the 'residence principle'. This can be seen as follows. Even in an
economy which has to use distortionary taxation to finance public
expenditure,  so that there are divergences between domestic
marginal rates of substitution and transformation, to attain a
'second-best' welfare optimum, the economy should still operate
with productive efficiency: given by the condition that the
marginal domestic rate of transformation should equal the foreign
rate of transformation under free trade. (see La1 (1974) for an
explication).
This argument is applied to a simple intertemporal model of
a small open economy in an integrated world economy by Frenkel,
Razin and Sadka  (1991)* depicted for the two period case by Fig.
5. OYt is the current endowment consisting of current GDP plus the
inherited capital stock from the previous period. With no
investment, private and public consumption in the next period will
be OYot+l. With investment given by leftward movements from Yt, the
economy can produce present and future private and public
consumption given by the domestic transformation curve ABM. With
perfect capital mobility, the economy will produce at B, where the
domestic rate of transformation equals one plus the world interest
rate (l+r) . With foreign borrowing of  If =CtZt, the economy's
intertemporal consumption frontier is RCzQ*. If there is no public
consumption,  C2 represents the intertemporal consumption
equilibrium. If the desired public consumption level is Gt and Gt+l
in the two periods, then the private intertemporal consumption
frontier is given by  MCOQ. Assuming that the government can
finance its expenditures in both periods through lump-sum taxes,
the private consumption point will be at  Cl, with the domestic
rate of substitution in consumption being equated to the domestic
and foreign rates of transformation.
Suppose the government has to use distortionary taxes to
'also see Frenkel and Razin (1996).15
finance its consumption. In that case following from the second
best Diamond-Mirrlees theorem it should still maintain productive
efficiency by producing at B, but tax intertemporal domestic
consumption by levying a tax on domestic residents of their
incomes (including that from abroad) given by the difference in
the slope of the MQ line and the slope of the indifference curve
passing through CO where the price consumption curve PCC (with
origin Q*) cuts (or is tangential) to the private intertemporal
consumption frontier MQ. The domestic and foreign marginal rates
of transformation would still be the
the marginal rate of substitution of
the new private consumption point CO.
By contrast if the government
same but no longer equal to
intertemporal consumption at
used the source principle of
taxation, it would distort the equality between the domestic and
foreign rates of transformation, as the domestic production point
shifts to the right of B. So from the viewpoint of optimal tax
theory, direct taxes in an integrated world economy should be
based on the residence principle.
What, if more realistically the State is not run by Platonic
Guardians, as this theory assumes, but is predatory? The relevant
framework is provided by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). To limit the
predatoriness of the State, they rightly recommend that, instead
of the optimal tax theorem that the State should levy taxes on
goods and factors of production whose demand and supply curves are
relatively inelastic (which minimizes the Harberger triangle
losses associated with distortionary taxation), the predatory
State should be constitutionally limited to only levy taxes on
goods and factors that are in relatively elastic supply. This
allows 'exit' and hence limits the amount that a revenue
maximizing predatory state can garner.
As it turns out, in an integrated world economy, mobile
capital's supply is likely to be fairly elastic. Even if its
direct taxation is based on the residence principle to ensure
second best productive efficiency, as long as the State finds it
difficult to tax foreign-source income because of enforcement16
difficulties, the otherwise predatory behavior which would ensue
if it could effectively implement the residence principle, will be
restrained- as domestic residents shift their capital from home to
abroad. The net effect will be that in practice the predatory
state will only be able to tax domestic source income but without
introducing the distortion which would be caused to productive
efficiency if it used the source principle of taxation!
This can be seen from Fig.5, where in fact the tax
equilibrium shown for the residence principle is not- as is common
in optimal tax theory- for some socially optimal level of
government consumption, but for the predatory revenue-maximizing
level: given by the tangency of the after tax private
intertemporal consumption frontier MQ with the price consumption
curve PCC. But now, without the ability to enforce taxation of
foreign source income, domestic residents can escape the predatory
tax rate by shifting their domestic investment abroad- on which in
effect there is no effective taxation. As the prey flees, the
predator will have to reduce the tax rate, hoping that at low
enough rates it will not be worth domestic resident's while to
evade the tax on their foreign source income.' A natural limit
would have been placed on the predatory state's base instincts,
whilst still maintaining productive efficiency.l'
'However, as Razin and Sadka (1991) show if foreign source
income cannot be taxed, then a Platonic Guardian government would
institute capital controls on second best social welfare grounds.
But of course, as much of optimal tax theory this is a
recommendation which would be in the interests of the predator and
not the prey if government's are not (as we know they are not)
Platonic.
"Within the optimal tax framework Razin et al (1998) show
that if there are information asymmetries which impede flows of
foreign debt investment and foreign equity flows, these flows
should be taxed differently from FDI for which there should be no
capital income tax for non-residents. For the others ,the non-
resident tax rate is lower than for residents for foreign debt and
negative for foreign equity flows. There are no domestic corporate
taxes charged on FDI, but these are positive in the case of equity
and high in the case of foreign debt flows.17
How does this principle relate to the cost-benefit
formula developed above? If the residence principle is applied
then no taxes should be levied on the foreign investor, for while
this may increase the social return from one particular
investment, by discouraging foreign investment in general, it will
lower its total value below the socially optimal level. There is
however one case where the host country should levy a tax on the
foreign investor. This is if the foreign investor's home country
grants tax credits against foreign taxes paid. In that case the
home country should levy a tax on the foreign investor at the rate
it would have to pay in its own country- on the residence
principle- if it paid no tax in the country of its operation.
Given the multiplicity of tax regimes and their
complex interactions not much more can be said about the general
principles for taxing foreign investment. By and large, in an
increasingly integrated world capital market, taxes on capital
(both domestic and foreign) will faut de mieux have to remain low.
This is an outcome that classical liberals should applaud.
However, there have been calls for tax harmonization of tax
regimes on foreign capital, and a proposal by the OECD to attempt
to regulate so called offshore tax havens- on the grounds that
these are now mainly centers for money laundering, particularly by
the large worldwide drug industry.
As regards the latter argument, as Krueger (1998) has
rightly argued, the illegal drug industry and its massive profits
are the result of inappropriate public policies towards drugs. The
'distortion'- in the parlance of the modern theory of trade and
welfare- that the regulation of drugs attempts to cure is a
'domestic distortion', due to a purported negative externality in
the consumption of drugs. As is well known, this requires a
domestic tax (which could be infinite- implying a consumption ban)
to correct the distortion. Attempting to effect supply by either
imposing restrictions on domestic or foreign production (through
supply measures or tariffs and quotas) will lower domestic
welfare. Most of the illegal drug profits are generated by the18
restrictions and regulations imposed on suppliers. These are
inefficient and also inequitable. The optimal policy would be to
legalize the drug trade but to impose taxes on the consumption of
drugs in the consuming countries. If this is done, there would be
no danger from money laundering to undermine the offshore banking
centers. They could (as they should from a classical liberal
viewpoint) continue to provide that competition amongst tax
jurisdictions on the Tiebout principle, which will lead to the
competitive harmonization of tax systems on capital on the
residence principle. (Frenkel, Razin and Sadka (1991)). There is
no need for any centralized process of tax harmonization by
governments.
The need for any such harmonization ,and hence for
international co-operation, would only arise -in principle- if the
authorities could manipulate the terms of trade. This case would
be identical to that of foreign trade (see Jones(1967)), where it
has been well known since Mill that, a country with monopoly or
monopsony power in trade could garner more of the cosmopolitan
gains from trade by levying the so-called 'optimum tariff'. To
prevent this outcome, as well as the possibility of a trade war
between a number of countries levying their optimal tariffs, which
would diminish the cosmopolitan gains from trade, international
co-operation in the form of an agreement to eschew the use of such
tariffs could maximize each country's as well world welfare.
However, it is even less likely than for foreign trade that any
country (even one as large as the US and the prospective EU) will
have enough monopoly or monopsony power in world capital markets
to make it worthwhile to levy the equivalent 'optimal tariffs' on
capital. Therefore, competition amongst different tax
jurisdictions should lead to the optimal residence principle being
adopted globally for the taxation of capital.ll
I1 However, as Sinn (1990) has emphasized, for this ideal
allocation of world capital to occur, each country needs to use
the strict Schnaz-Haig-Simons definition of capital income, which
excludes distortions due to accelerated depreciation, non-taxed19
V. REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FLOWS
Thus it seems that capital market integration is going to lead
to relatively benign tax regimes for capital worldwide. Much more
worrying is the growing trend towards 'harmonizing' regulatory
policies. These regulations concern both FDI  ( in the form of
anti-trust type regulations) as well as financial capital in the
form mainly of foreign bank lending. I deal with both in turn.
There are two types of regulatory problems emerging for FDI.
The first is the desire to extend US style anti-trust legislation
worldwide- to counteract the so-called 'monopolistic' power of
global corporations. The second, of particular relevance to
developing countries- whose cash-strapped public sectors are
forcing them to rely increasingly on FDI to finance and produce
the infrastructure which has elements of natural monopoly- is to
create regulatory regimes for privatized infrastructure services.
On these issues I can be brief, as I have dealt with them in some
detail recently  (La1 (1998a). The following points need to be
borne in mind. First the intellectual basis for the regulatory
regimes being proposed or for their extension  ( as in the case of
anti-trust) is based on the wholly inadequate and Utopian model of
'market failure' derived from the 'nirvana economics' of the
Arrow-Debreu model. From the more appropriate classical notion of
competition, revived most comprehensively by the UCLA industrial
organization school (see Demsetz (1988,  1989)), there is no case
for anti-trust legislation either nationally or internationally.
capital gains and other divergences from correct accounting. As
Sinn also notes, with reference to the emerging tax harmonization
in the EU, the emerging tax regime in an integrated economy will
imply that only immobile factors of production will ultimately be
taxable. He laments the limit this will place on the
redistributive abilities of European governments- particularly on
financing their welfare states. But for classical liberals, who
have always opposed the predatory state's corruption of the polity
by using other people's money to demonstrate its 'compassion, this
is an outcome to be devoutly wished.20
For the natural monopoly elements in infrastructure services, the
appropriate policy is to organize auctions for 'competition for
the field' for their provision (on the lines set out in Demsetz
(1989) Chp.6 ). Again no regulatory regime is requires.
While the economics seems clear-cut, the attempt to roll
back existing and prevent future regulations is hampered by the
political economy of predatory democratic states, as witness the
signal failure of the Republican Congressional majority in its
attempts to do so in the US. To deal adequately with this issue
would take me too far afield. But I have recently come to the view
that many of these problems are due to the growing moral
incoherence of the  West.(Lal (199833, 1998c). However, there may
hopefully be an antidote. In particular, the  US's attempts to
legislate its changing and fractured morality (public and private)
world wide (eg. the Helms-Burton bill and other claims to extra
territorial rights to impose sanctions in line with its moral
preferences) is now increasingly meeting resistance from the Rest.
Though there is still the danger that this might trigger that
'clash of civilizations' hypothesized by Huntington, I am more
hopeful that (as is happening in the talks on Helms-Burton between
the US and the EU) an international 'disarmament' agreement will
be reached where countries will forbear from imposing their ethics
on others. If this happens, we will have international competition
amongst national regulatory regimes (with no extraterritorial
reach). As in the case of competition between tax jurisdictions,
this global competition amongst national regulatory regimes should
be viewed with a benign eye by classical liberals. As in most
forms of competition, the converse of Gresham's law should apply
with the bad being displaced by the good, i.e minimal or no
regulation. What must be resisted are the various moves by
international agencies to create a centralized international
regulatory regime.
This brings us to the regulation of financial flows. There
are two issues. The first concerns the need to regulate financial
and banking institutions both nationally and internationally. Here21
the mainstream justification is again based on 'market failure'.  (
See eg. King (1990)). First, on the purported asymmetries of
information between buyers and sellers of financial services which
it is claimed create the need for investor protection. Second, the
externalities which are supposed to arise when the distress of
financial institutions is supposed to lead to 'systemic' problems.
Neither argument is cogent. There is no reason why the
asymmetries in information should be anymore severe in financial
as opposed to many other markets providing goods and services: eg.
for household goods and repairs, car maintenance, and those for
second hand consumer durables. If there is no need for these
markets to be publicly regulated why should there be for financial
services? As regards the externality argument, it is clear that
what is at issue are pecuniary externalities, which since Buchanan
and Stubblebine (1962) we know are not 'Pareto relevant'. I2 The
same argument based on pecuniary externalities would apply to the
failure of a large number of industrial companies in a country.
But we do not seek to eliminate industrial bankruptcies on the
grounds of systemic dangers, so why should we do so for financial
institutions?
The special problems relating to financial institutions
arise (as is well known) because of the moral hazard created by
implicit or explicit public insurance of their deposits.This, and
the fact that their business is to deal with 'paper promises',
makes them prone to fraud. Which in turn leads to the perhaps
justifiable demand that, as it seems politically impossible to
dispense with deposit insurance, regulation is needed to create
transparency in the reporting of their balance sheets as well as
for the enforcement of capital adequacy criteria on these
financial institutions. I discuss this aspect of the 'moral
hazard' associated with bank lending in the context of
I2 A number of other arguments for international co-operation
based on pecuniary externalities are critically examined in my
1990 Wincott lecture (La1 (1990)).international capital markets below.
Before that we also need to take account of another view,
which sees financial markets as being inherently unstable and
requiring regulation to create greater 'economic security'. (see
Minsky (1977), Kindleberger (!978)). The global equity and
financial market has been described as a giant casino which needs
to be controlled in the interests of the non-gambling majority of
the world's citizens. (see Strange (1986)). Speculative bubbles in
which over-lending is followed by collapse and crisis are
purported to be endemic in capitalist economies which then require
a lender of last resort to mitigate the deflationary impact of a
financial crash caused by the panic following the mania which
caused the  bubble.13 As Flemming (1982) rightly notes about this
argument, it assumes that "enterprises adopt excessively exposed
geared, levered positions in a period of stability that does not
in fact reflect a favorable shift in the economy's stochastic
environment.. [It] depends on agents failing to distinguish a run
of good luck from a favorable structural shift in their
environment. Such errors are not only identifiable but also
optimal if agents attach the correct non-zero probability to
structural changes. If Minsky believes that people are too willing
to believe that such changes have occurred, he should consider
suggesting to the authorities that they intervene randomly in
financial markets- by increasing their variance, such intervention
would hinder the recognition of genuine shifts and should also
inhibit false inferences" (p.40).
I3 In this context it should be noted that there is also a
large academic literature on floating exchange rates which claims
that an international regime based on them is prone to speculative
bubbles which lead to sustained divergences of exchange rates from
their economic 'fundamentals'. The best critique and discussion of
this literature on rational speculative bubbles is  Mussa (1990).
As he concludes: "A rational speculative bubble implies not only
that people are sometimes crazy, but that they are systematically,
calculatingly, and fanatically insane... I conclude therefore that
rational speculative bubbles are empirically irrelevant and
theoretically absurd"  (PP.13-14)The recent turmoil in East Asia, the earlier Mexican crisis,
and the 80's debt crisis, have led many observers to suggest that
developing countries -with fragile domestic financial sectors and
incomplete transitions from the plan to the  market- should
maintain some form of capital controls on short term capital
inflows. The Chilean's imposition of an implicit tax on these
inflows is much commended. While international dirigistes are
recommending the institution of the Tobin tax on all international
non-FDI flows to throw some sand into the workings of the system.
The proceeds of the tax being handed over to the UNDP (See UNDP)!
While there is no merit in the latter proposal, there are
problems with foreign bank lending which, the recent experience of
developing countries suggests, do merit consideration. There are
two problems.14  First, unlike foreign equity investment and FDI,
foreign bank loans denominated in foreign currency do not involve
the sharing of the foreign exchange and income risks associated
with the lending by both borrowers and lenders. Second, the
operations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have created
I4 In addition to the two problems mentioned in the text there
were two other factors responsible for the Asian financial crisis.
The first was the quasi fixed exchange rate regime in many
countries. It is increasingly becoming clear that only two
exchange rate regimes are viable in a globalized capital market: a
freely floating rate or a rigidly fixed one as in a currency
board. These are the only ones which allow automatic adjustment to
external and internal shocks without any need for discretionary
action by the authorities who do not have the time or the
information to deal with the actions of a highly decentralized but
integrated global capital market mediating these shocks. Their
actions are often inappropriate leading to serious misalignments
of the real exchange rate. Second, the crisis showed up a
systematic fault in the 'Asian' model of development in which
there was a close linkage between the domestic banking system,
large industrial enterprises and the government. By making the
banking system the creature of the government's will, it creates
tremendous moral hazard in the domestic banking system. When this
moral hazard is combined with that created by the IMF for foreign
bank lending, the economy is in double jeopardy. Foreign banks
lending to domestic banks which know they will be bailed out, will
over-end, leading to ropy investments and an eventual debt crisis
for the country.24
serious problems of moral hazard in this part of the international
capital market. The first problem implies that, when for some
reason, there is a need for adjustment in the country which
requires an exchange rate depreciation, the debt burden of the
country denominated in local currency rises, the larger is the
share of foreign bank loans denominated in foreign currency in its
total debt exposure. This in itself would not matter, if the loans
were contracted by private domestic agents and there was no
implicit or explicit government guarantee. However, the actions of
the IMF -the second problem- which has in effect become the
international debt collector for foreign banks, belies the last
assumption.
The recent crisis in Indonesia brings out the problem most
starkly. Before the crisis, there was little wrong with
Indonesia's economic fundamentals. It had also been, by LDC
standards, an exceptionally well-managed economy, which despite
the prevalence of 'crony capitalism' had seen one of the most
impressive economic transformations in Asia  - combining growth
with  equity- under  Suharto's rule. (see  La1 and Myint (1996)).
Moreover, its foreign bank debt, apart from not being excessive,
was also all private. When a run developed on these loans,
following the panic introduced by the Thai crisis, and the rupiah
had to be devalued, most of these private loans turned sour. In a
well-functioning system the private borrowers would have defaulted
on these loans, unless their bankers were willing to see this as a
short run crisis and roll them over. But then, enter the IMF.
Following on its past record in the 1980's debt and 1990's Mexican
crisis, the IMF, with the backing of the US and Japan (whose banks
were the most exposed and stood to lose the most), declared that
there was a systemic threat to the world financial system from an
Indonesian private sector default. The Indonesian government,
under the smoke screen of an IMF program, was forced to take on
the private sector's liabilities and promise to pay off the
foreign bankers through taxes on all its citizens. This has
created a serious problem of moral hazard for this type of25
lending. The smartest thing for any one to do today is to set up a
foreign bank, make loans to the ropiest LDC firms at exorbitant
interest rates, and when these turn sour say there is a danger to
the world financial system, which the IMF will then seek to
prevent by forcing the government to take over these debts and pay
them back from taxing its citizens!
The ideal solution is of course to shut down the  IMF.15
Since Nixon closed the Gold window it has been like Pirandello's
play "Six characters in search of an author"- in search of a play.
Ever since its justification as the overseer of the gold exchange
standard created at  Bretton Woods collapsed, with the move to
generalized floating, it has had no justification. It has smartly
stepped into the opportunities offered by the 80's debt crisis and
the problems created by the post 1989 East European countries
moving from the Plan to the market. Whatever its achievements in
these respects in the past, the recent East Asian crisis now shows
it to be as much part of the problem as the solution.
Suppose, however, that it is not shut down, as there is no
redundant international institution- from the  ILO, UNESCO, UNIDO
to UNCTAD- which has died. In that case, developing countries will
have to live with the continuing moral hazard in the market for
foreign bank loans. How should they deal with this? Many dirigiste
governments are using this as an excuse to delay or prevent any
I5 In its most recent play the supporters of the IMF want to
convert it into an international lender of last resort. But this
is totally misconceived. There are two functions that a lender of
last resort has to perform as set out in Bagheot's rule. First, it
should be able to create high powered money quickly to on-lend to
solvent banks to prevent a liquidity crisis. Second, it must be
able to distinguish between good and bad 'paper' and thus judge
the soundness of the banks to which it is extending liquidity,
with the insolvent banks being liquidated. The IMF is incapable of
doing either. It can only lend after lengthy negotiations with a
country's government and with the approval of the board. Second it
has no way of sorting out the 'good' from 'bad' loans for instance
made by foreign banks to residents in the country, and to
liquidate the latter. The lender of last resort function for the
money center banks involved in foreign lending must therefore
continue to be provided by their parent central banks.26
opening of their capital accounts. Others are thinking of adopting
variants of the Chilean scheme. The ideal way to deal with
volatile foreign bank lending is for local central banks to ensure
that all such borrowing is suitably hedged. But if they lack the
requisite capital markets for such hedging, instead of the
dirigiste options being offered, there is an alternative and
superior market- mediated way of 'regulating' these flows. This is
to recognize that the main 'systemic' danger to the country lies
in the fact that these foreign bank lenders do not share in the
foreign exchange risk associated with these loans. A simple way of
making them do so, and thus putting these loans on a par with
foreign equity and FDI, would be to allow domestic residents to
borrow only in local currency. Besides raising the costs of such
borrowing- implying an implicit tax on such borrowing- by imposing
a capital loss on banks which run in a panic leading to a
depreciation of the currency, this enforced sharing of the foreign
currency risk should also give them some cause to pause. Apart
from this limited and hopefully temporary 'second best' regulation
- till domestic markets to hedge foreign currency exposure are
well developed-there seems to be little justification for the
regulation of international flows of capital.27
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